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How the United States Uses the Trans-Pacific
Partnership to Contain China in International Trade
Daniel C.K. Chow

Abstract
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was signed on February 5, 2016 by its twelve
members and is now open for ratification. If ratified, the TPP will be the largest mega free trade
area in history and will encompass forty percent of world trade. The U.S. led the TPP negotiations
and deliberately excluded China from the negotiations. This ploy by the U.S. was a calculated
effort to contain China and to shift power in trade in the Asia-Pacific from China to the U.S.
China now appears to face a difficult choice. China can join the already concluded TPP, with its
text largely drafted by the U.S., and submit to terms it had no part in negotiating and to a
humiliating process of seeking approval from the U.S. Joining the TPP means accepting a treaty
in which every major provision is directed at China in an attempt to contain China’s ascendancy
in international trade. The other alternative is to ignore the TPP, but this could mean significant
losses in trade opportunities right in China’s own neighborhood. The battle over the TPP is a
major contest between the two countries to determine which will write the rules of international
trade for the twenty-first century. On the one hand, the U.S. is determined to write the rules,
which will have as their chief aim to contain China. On the other hand, China seeks to write the
rules in a way that will benefit China at the expense of the U.S. This Article examines how the
TPP is designed specifically to contain China and how China might respond to this challenge
over who will write the rules of international trade and gain supremacy in trade in the twentyfirst century.



Frank E. and Virginia H. Bazler Chair in Business Law, the Ohio State University College of Law.
The author lived and worked in China for several years as in-house counsel for a major multinational
company. The author dealt with all issues of the company relating to investment and intellectual
property.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
The U.S. achieved an important strategic objective in its efforts to contain
the People’s Republic of China (China) in global trade when the historic TransPacific Partnership (TPP) was signed on February 5, 2016.1 The negotiations
leading to the TPP have been called the most significant since the Uruguay Round
of negotiations that led to the establishment of the World Trade Organization
(WTO).2 Now open for ratification,3 the TPP is a vast free trade agreement
covering the Asia-Pacific region and encompassing forty percent of world trade.4
The TPP promises “WTO plus” treatment—that is, trade privileges more
favorable than those available under the World Trade Organization for all of TPP
members, but not available for non-members, such as China.5 The TPP now
stands ready for ratification by its twelve members: Australia, Brunei, Canada,
Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the U.S., and
Vietnam, with other countries, such as South Korea, expressing interest in
joining.6 If the TPP gets ratified and becomes legally binding,7 it will be an
unprecedented mega free trade agreement and could permanently change the
course of international trade in Asia by shifting power to the U.S. and away from
China.8 This possible shift can be seen in the glaring exclusion in the list of TPP
members: China—the world’s second largest economy located right in the heart
of the territory of the TPP—was not invited to join in the TPP negotiations or to
sign the agreement.9
China’s exclusion from the TPP negotiations was no accident, but instead
was a deliberate ploy by the U.S. to limit China’s growing global trade influence

1

2

See Catherine Putz, TPP: The Ratification Race is On, THE DIPLOMAT (Feb. 5, 2016),
http://perma.cc/VRU5-ZC7U; see also Michal Meidan, The TPP and China: The Elephant That Wasn’t
in the Room, THE DIPLOMAT (Oct. 15, 2015), http://perma.cc/P5TE-4G6N. For the full text of the
TPP, see TPP Full Text, Office of the United States Trade Representative, https://perma.cc/77GYEY5E (last visited Oct. 4, 2016).
See TPP Full Text, supra note 1.

3

See id. at art. 30(5); see also Rebecca Howard, Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal signed, but years of
negotiations still to come, REUTERS (Feb. 4, 2016), http://perma.cc/5DDA-2Z5B.

4

See Howard, supra note 3.
See infra Section II.

5
6
7
8
9

See supra note 1.
The TPP comes into force once it is ratified. See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 30(5).
See infra Section IV.
See id. By the time China could have joined in the negotiations, the major provisions of the text
affecting China had been completed. New members must accept the text as is and cannot revisit
any text that has been completed. Any new member can only participate in negotiations on new
text.

372

Vol. 17 No. 2

The Trans-Pacific Partnership

Chow

starting right in China’s own backyard.10 The U.S. did not want China’s input on
the terms of the TPP as is; rather, the U.S. wanted to dictate the terms of the TPP
on its own, with the cooperation of the other compliant TPP members.11 Now
that the negotiations over the TPP text have been formally concluded and the
ratification process has begun, China can join the TPP, but only under conditions
imposed by the U.S. in the text of the TPP.12 China will be allowed to join only by
accepting all of the terms of the TPP as is, and is without any power to alter,
propose revisions, or dilute any of its provisions unless approved by all the TPP
countries, including the U.S.13 Moreover, in order to join the TPP, China might
have to undergo a humiliating process of submitting its terms of admission,
essentially an application, to the U.S. Congress for review and approval,14 a process
that could take several years and could expose China to many additional demands
by Congress that China must accept as conditions of joining the TPP. Congress
might also relish the opportunity to use the approval process to scold and
embarrass China in its conduct of international trade.15
10

See infra Section IV.

11

See id.
Since the text of the U.S.-led TPP is final and agreed to by the signature of the TPP parties on Feb.
5, 2016, the only way to change the text is to amend it. Amendments require the consent of all
members, including the U.S. See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 30(2) (describing amendments as requiring
the consent of all members).
See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 30(2).

12

13
14

See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 30(4) (describing the accession process as requiring the approval of
each TPP member including the U.S. in accordance with applicable legal procedures of each
member). If Congress approves the TPP, Congress will also issue a regulation on the approval
procedures for new members of the TPP; Congress issued a similar regulation for new WTO
members when it approved and implemented the WTO agreements in the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 1-3-465, 108 Stat. 4829 (1994) codified as 19 U.S.C. § 3532
[hereinafter URAA]. Article I, § 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to “regulate
commerce with foreign nations,” giving Congress the final say on U.S. trade law and policy.
Congress could enact legislation requiring congressional approval of all new TPP members, but it
is more likely that Congress will follow the model of the URAA. With respect to new members of
the WTO, the URAA requires that “the [United States] Trade Representative . . . consult with the
appropriate congressional committees before any vote is taken by the Ministerial Conference [of
the WTO] . . . relating to . . . the accession of a state.” Implementation of Uruguay Round
Agreements, 19 U.S.C.A. § 3532 (1994). If Congress enacts a similar provision related to new
members of the TPP, which seems likely, Congress could hold public hearings on China’s accession
to the TPP.

15

Congress might criticize China for “cheating” in international trade as there is a commonly held
view that China ignores the rules of the WTO. See David Pilling, It won’t be easy to build an ‘anyone but
China’ club, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (May 22, 2013), http://perma.cc/MP89-AFMB. Prior to China’s
ascension to the WTO, the U.S. Congress held hearings every year to determine whether to extend
trade benefits to China under the Most-Favored Nation Principle, which would allow China to
enjoy lower tariffs on its imports into the U.S. The U.S. used the annual review process as an
opportunity to make threats and lecture China on its deficiencies in its human rights record. See
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Creating an “anyone but China club”16 was an express and aggressive
objective of the U.S. in establishing the TPP. Although China was never a party
to the TPP negotiations, China played a key role in the positions advocated by the
U.S. In the words of one observer, “China is the ultimate target of every major
U.S. proposal in the [TPP, a] ‘new generation twenty-first-century agreement.’”17
One of the motives behind the TPP is to force China into accepting obligations
that exceed those of the WTO.18 Many politicians, trade unions, and businesses
believe that China was able to reap the advantages of its WTO membership while
paying little in return.19 In exchange for the benefits of obtaining greater access to
foreign markets, WTO members are required to reduce trade barriers in order to
open up their own markets to other WTO members.20 After it joined the WTO,
however, China allowed many of its trade barriers to persist by ignoring many of
the rules of the WTO.21 For example, China gained trade advantages by continuing
to subsidize its massive state-owned enterprises and by ignoring intellectual
property rules.22 In other words, some critics regard China as a free-rider of the
WTO, reaping the benefits of the WTO while not playing fair through
contributing in kind by following the rules of international trade.23 The TPP can
help to rein in China’s behavior by imposing rules that exceed WTO obligations,
backed by the TPP’s own dispute resolution process that will have the bite of trade
sanctions for refusing to comply with TPP obligations.24 The TPP itself is
compatible with the WTO, which means that TPP countries continue to be bound

Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Opposes Human Rights in the World Trade Organization, 35 U. PENN. J.
INT’L L. 61, 77–80 (2013). China found this process to be humiliating and the common perception
at the time was that these annual reviews were an opportunity for China “bashing.” See id. at 79–80
& n.91.
16
17

18

19
20

21

See Pilling, supra note 15.
See Jane Kelsey, U.S. China Relations and the Geopolitics of the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement, GLOBAL
RESEARCH (Nov. 11, 2013), http://perma.cc/D4EJ-PU4W; see also Nathan Vanderklippe, TPP deal
a way for U.S. to reassert primacy over China, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Oct. 5, 2015),
https://perma.cc/L6LM-WXJJ.
China joined the WTO in 2001. See Member Information: China and the WTO, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, http://perma.cc/R34K-6RUU (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
See Pilling, supra note 15.
See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: PROBLEMS,
CASES, AND MATERIALS 26 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW].
See Pilling, supra note 15.

23

See id.
See id.

24

See infra Section II.A.

22
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by the WTO25 and that the TPP cannot be challenged by China under the WTO
as discriminatory or otherwise unlawful.26
Reining in or constraining China in international trade is achieved by the
TPP through a number of specific trade provisions; the major provisions are the
subjects of study in this Article. For the U.S. government, these various provisions
of the TPP serve three important objectives, set forth below, which both threaten
and constrain China. These three features of the TPP seem to put China in a
difficult conundrum—China can suffer losses in international trade by refusing to
join the TPP, or it can join the TPP and be subject to the humiliation of having
to abide by rules written by the U.S. with the express intent of containing China.
First, the threat to China if they refuse to join the TPP is a loss of trade with
the U.S. and other TPP members.27 From an economic perspective, the TPP, like
all preferential trade agreements (PTAs), is a double-edged sword in that it both
creates and diverts trade.28 PTAs increase trade among their members because
intra-PTA trade faces fewer trade barriers.29 For example, in the trade of goods,
PTA members are allowed to offer “WTO plus” treatment, such as lower tariffs
than the WTO rate (and ultimately zero tariffs) for goods traded from other PTA
members.30 This helps to increase the trade in goods among PTA members, as
imports are less expensive, since, they come in at lower tariffs or even duty free,31
than imports from China, which are subject to the regular WTO rate from TPP
members.32 Assuming that the quality of the imports is the same or similar,
importers from PTA members would prefer to buy goods from other PTA
members as opposed to non-PTA members because goods from PTA members
are less expensive.33 Therefore, if China does not join the TPP, China might suffer
losses in its trade with the U.S. as well as other TPP members.34 This could lead
to the reduction of the record $365.7 billion trade deficit that the U.S. has with

25

See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 1(2) (noting that the TPP is to “coexist with their existing international
agreements . . . including the WTO agreement.”).

26

The TPP is authorized by Article XXIV:5 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which
permits WTO members to form free trade agreements such as the TPP. For a more detailed
explanation of this point, see infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.

27
28
29
30
31

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

33

See id.
See id.

34

See id.

32
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China as of 2015.35 The ever-expanding U.S. trade deficit with China has proven
to be an incendiary and bitter political and business issue in the U.S., 36 fueled by
beliefs that China is cheating in international trade.37 The TPP could help to
address these grievances by diverting trade away from China and directing trade
toward other countries, such as Australia, that enjoy more friendly relations with
the U.S.
Second, if China does join the TPP, China will be constrained because the
TPP will erode many of the trade advantages that China now enjoys and is able to
exploit under the WTO.38 For example, according to many critics, China does not
enforce laws relating to workers’ rights.39 China has allowed its workers to toil
long hours in unsanitary and dangerous working conditions with few rights to
demand any changes.40 Although China has high-level labor laws dealing with all
of these issues, China does not enforce them, thus allowing labor abuses to
continue without any consequences.41 Aside from the social issues of human
rights, the non-enforcement of labor laws reduces the costs to the employer of
labor in manufacturing. Low labor costs allow China to charge lower prices for its
goods that are exported to the U.S. The TPP will impose higher labor standards
on China, increasing the protection for China’s workers and at the same time
increasing the prices of its goods.42 The TPP also creates a dispute settlement
mechanism that other TPP members can use to compel China to either enforce
these obligations or face sanctions under the TPP.43
Similarly, China does not enforce environmental standards in producing its
goods, leading to not only the degradation of the environment, but more
importantly in the context of trade, to lower-priced goods.44 Refusing to follow
high-level environmental standards and continuing to use “dirty fuel,” such as
coal-fired power plants, that pollute the environment, is a serious social issue.
From a trade perspective, dirty fuel is a cheaper way to produce goods that can

35

36

See Kimberly Amadeo, Why Is The U.S./China Trade Deficit So High?, THE BALANCE (Sept. 8, 2016),
http://perma.cc/3RN8-7HMH.
See infra Section II.C.

37

See, for example, Daniel Mills, China Cheats While the U.S. Suffers, ECONOMY IN CRISIS (May 25, 2014),
http://perma.cc/RKQ3-U7AU.

38

See infra Section III.
See infra Section III.A.

39
40
41

See id.
See id.

43

See id.
See infra Section III.A.

44

See infra Section III.B.

42
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out-compete U.S. produced goods based on price.45 The U.S. uses
environmentally sustainable sources of power to manufacture goods.46 Of course,
using environmentally sustainable power involves the use of expensive
technologies that result in higher costs that are passed onto the consumer of
products in the form of high prices. China can charge lower prices because it does
not use more expensive forms of production that are friendly to the environment.
The TPP would impose environmental obligations on China that would force
China to use manufacturing processes that are more environmentally friendly and
expensive. China would need to raise prices for its goods and this obligation would
help to even the playing field between the U.S. and China.
Other measures that China currently maintains are financial and regulatory
support of China’s massive state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that benefit from
myriad forms of state assistance and from discrimination against foreign
companies located in China.47 These SOEs are thus able to lower the cost of their
goods or services that are provided in China and abroad and out-compete foreign
companies located in China due to favoritism from the Chinese government.48
The TPP is designed to neutralize the advantages that China enjoys from its
treatment of SOEs.49
Third, the TPP is a shot aimed squarely—by the U.S.—at China that lets
China know in no uncertain terms that the U.S., not China, intends to write the
rules of international trade for Asia and the rest of the world in the twenty-first
century.50 The U.S., with a few of its close allies in Europe and Japan, has
essentially written the rules of international trade for the past seventy years since
the end of the Second World War.51 Recently, however, this paradigm has come
under siege from China. In the past decade, China has entered into many free
trade agreements that differ in fundamental ways from the U.S.-led rules of
international trade.52 In contrast with U.S. trade agreements, China’s free trade
agreements have no meaningful provisions concerning workers’ rights, the
environment, or SOEs.53 Earlier this year, China established the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with a set of rules for international
45

See id.

46

See id.
See infra Section III.C.

47
48
49

See id.
See id.

52

See infra Section IV.
See Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, 49 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming 2016).
See infra Section IV.

53

See id.

50
51
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financing that directly challenges the U.S.-dominated World Bank and
International Monetary Fund that have controlled international lending for the
past seventy years.54 The AIIB is a direct challenge to the U.S. in setting investment
rules in Asia and other countries.55 The TPP is the U.S.’s latest volley in the
growing rivalry between the U.S. and China on who will write the rules of
international trade for the twenty-first century.56 How China responds to the
threat and challenge of the TPP is an important development in this growing
rivalry between the two largest economies in the world.
This Article will develop the themes set forth above by proceeding in three
sections. Section II will discuss the nature of preferential trade agreements and
their relationship to the WTO, and detail how PTAs both create and divert trade
and the threat this poses to China if China refuses to join the TPP. Section III of
this Article will examine how joining the TPP will neutralize key advantages China
currently enjoys in international trade, including concerns related to workers’
rights, the environment, and state-owned enterprises. Section IV will discuss how
the U.S. and China are locked in a fierce battle on who will write the rules for
international trade in the twenty-first century and how the TPP appears to be a
major victory for the U.S., assuming that the TPP is ratified by the U.S. Congress,57
in this ongoing battle. Section V then concludes with some observations about
future developments, including how China might respond to the TPP.

II. T HE WTO, P REFER ENTIAL T RADE A GR EEMENTS , AND
THE TPP
The TPP is a comprehensive PTA that not only liberalizes the trade in
goods,58 but also includes trade in services,59 financial services,60

54

See supra note 51.

55

See id.
See id.

56
57

Factors influencing whether the U.S. Congress will approve the TPP are whether (1) PresidentElect Donald Trump will reverse his campaign position opposing the TPP; (2) Trump will
renegotiate the TPP and seek Congressional approval of a modified TPP; and (3) the next election
cycle in 2020 will result in a new President who supports the TPP. In the author’s view, it is possible
that President-Elect Trump will reverse candidate Trump’s opposition to the current or modified
version of the TPP because the TPP is designed to increase U.S. export trade opportunities, increase
employment, and reign in China’s aggressive trade tactics, a favorite subject of criticism during
President-Elect Trump’s campaign.

58
59

See TPP, supra note 1, at ch. 2 (National Treatment and Market Access).
See id. at ch. 10 (Trade in Services).

60

See id. at ch. 11 (Financial Services).
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telecommunications,61 foreign direct investment,62 government transparency and
anti-corruption,63 coherence in government regulation,64 and technology transfer
(intellectual property).65 The TPP also has an effective dispute settlement system,
modeled after that of the WTO, that is generally regarded as a great success in
enforcing WTO obligations.66 Similar to the WTO, the TPP’s dispute settlement
system can authorize trade sanctions to enforce TPP obligations, which makes the
TPP’s enforcement mechanism one of its key features.67
In order to facilitate an understanding of how the TPP—or any preferential
trade agreement—works, the following discussion will focus on the trade in goods
because it is still the most fundamental and important channel of trade, far
exceeding all other channels of trade (services, investment, and intellectual
property) in monetary terms.68 In addition, understanding how PTAs liberalize the
trade in goods will also help in understanding how the PTA liberalizes trade in
services, investment, and technology (intellectual property) as the same basic
principles apply (with some variations) in all these channels. This discussion also
explains the relationship between the TPP and the WTO, and why the WTO both
permits and encourages preferential trade agreements like the TPP.

A. The WTO, the Most-Favored-Nation
Preferential Trade Areas

Principle,

and

The twelve countries that are members of the TPP are also members of the
WTO and are subject to the obligations of both organizations.69 Established in
1995,70 the WTO remains the landmark and fundamental multilateral treaty that
61

See id. at ch. 13 (Telecommunications).

62

See id. at ch. 9 (Investment).
See id. at ch. 26 (Transparency and Anti-Corruption)

63
64
65
66
67

68

69

70

See id. at ch. 25 (Regulatory Coherence).
See id. at ch. 18 (Intellectual Property).
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 63.
See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 3–4, 6. The technical term used by the TPP for trade sanctions is the
“suspension of benefits.” For example, suppose that Country A, a TPP member, has agreed to zero
tariffs for goods from Country B. If Country B fails to comply with the TPP, the TPP can authorize
Country A to suspend its zero tariffs for goods from Country B, which would then likely be subject
to higher tariffs under Country A’s GATT rate. Country B would suffer a loss in trade due to the
higher tariffs. This is what constitutes a trade sanction under the TPP and the WTO.
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 9, 14–15 (comparing
recent figures for trade in goods, services, investment and technology).
See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 1(2) (recognizing that the TPP agreement “co-exists” with the WTO
agreements).
See What is the WTO?, World Trade Organization, http://perma.cc/E3SA-W3LN, (last visited Oct.
5, 2016).
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governs most international trade in the world today.71 Trade in goods among
WTO member nations (currently consisting of 164 nations, including all TPP
countries) is governed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).72 The GATT is one of the three major WTO agreements covering
world trade. The other major agreements are the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS),73 which covers services trade, and the Agreement on TradeRelated Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),74 which covers trade in technology
or intellectual property.
Of these agreements, the GATT has the longest and most venerable
history, beginning in 1947, immediately following the Second World War.75 Prior
to the GATT’s promulgation in 1947, no international discipline existed to curb
the power of countries to impose tariffs on imports at the border.76 This meant
that countries could impose tariffs at any level they pleased without violating any
international legal obligations.77 In the period prior to the Second World War,
many countries imposed draconian tariffs as protectionist and nationalistic
sentiments ran high.78 In 1930, the U.S. enacted the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act79,
which imposed tariffs that averaged over fifty-three percent of the value of the
products imported into the U.S.80 Other countries also passed similarly
draconian tariffs.81 The purpose of these prohibitively high tariffs was to prevent
trade.82 Nations refused to trade and viewed each other with mistrust and
hostility.83 The protectionist and nationalist sentiments that swept the globe in
71

The WTO website indicates that the WTO currently has 164 members, including all of the most
powerful economies in the world. See Members and Observers, World Trade Organization,
http://perma.cc/T848-KV64, (last visited Oct. 5, 2016).

72

See GATT and the Goods Council, World Trade Organization, http://perma.cc/5ZNW-FHYY, (last
visited Oct. 5, 2016).

73

See General Agreement on Trade in Services, World Trade Organization, http://perma.cc/NX48-LTJP,
(last visited Oct. 5, 2016).

74

See TRIPS [trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights] material on the WTO website,
World Trade Organization, http://perma.cc/AK4M-CGFL, (last visited Oct. 5, 2016).

75

See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 26.
See id. (describing how the GATT limits the use of tariffs as a trade barrier). Prior to the GATT no
such mechanism existed to limit the use of tariffs. This meant that if a nation raised its tariffs other
nations could raise theirs in a tit-for-tat response.

76

77
78
79
80

See id.
See id. at 18.
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202–1683 (1930).
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 18.

82

See id.
See id.

83

See id.

81
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the 1930s contributed to the eruption of the Second World War that inflicted
catastrophe upon the world.84 One lesson from the Second World War is that
nations in economic conflict often fall into military conflict.85
The GATT (1947) was intended to impose much-needed discipline on the
use of tariffs in order to avoid the disastrous use of tariffs to create barriers to
trade that engendered suspicion and hostility.86 Under GATT Article II1(b), each
nation, after negotiating and reaching agreement with all other GATT (and now
WTO) members, will establish a GATT schedule, that is, a schedule for all tariffs
that a GATT/WTO member will impose on imports from all other
GATT/WTO countries.87 Each nation’s tariff schedule is filed with the WTO
and is attached to the GATT as an annex.88 Under GATT Article II, each nation
has an obligation to impose tariffs no higher than the tariffs in its GATT
schedule.89 In other words, the nation’s tariffs are “bound,” that is, subject to a
ceiling created in its GATT schedule.90 A nation that imposes a tariff that
exceeds its GATT schedule is in violation of Article II of the GATT/WTO and
will have to withdraw the tariff or face consequences under the WTO dispute
settlement process, 91 which has proven to be an effective dispute resolution
mechanism.92 After the initial tariff schedules were established as a result of
84
85
86
87

88
89
90

91

92

See id.
See id.
See id. at 26.
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. II(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT].
See id.
See id.
See id. at art II:1(a). If a tariff is “unbound” then a WTO member can impose any tariff at any level
it sees fit.
Imposing a tariff duty that is above the bound rate is a violation of Article II:1(a)–(b). See Appellate
Body Report, Argentina–Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, ¶ 46–
55, WTO Doc. WT/DS56/AB/R (adopted on Apr. 22, 1998). There, the Appellate Body held:
A tariff binding in a Member’s Schedule provides an upper limit on the amount
of duty that may be imposed . . . The principal obligation in the first sentence
of Article II:1(b) . . . requires a Member to refrain from imposing ordinary
customs duties in excess of those provided for in the Member’s Schedule. . . .
We conclude that the application of a type of duty different from the type
provided for in a Member’s Schedule is inconsistent with Article II:1(b) . . . In
this case, we find that Argentina has acted inconsistently with its obligations
under Article II:1(b), first sentence, of the GATT 1994.
Id.
WTO disputes are resolved by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which consists of panels
that operate as trial courts, and an appellate body that functions as a high court of international
trade. Decisions by the panels and the appellate body create institutional pressure on WTO
members to correct any WTO violations; the WTO DSB can also authorize the imposition of trade
sanctions against a recalcitrant offending member that creates additional pressures to comply. See

Winter 2017

381

Chicago Journal of International Law

GATT (1947), GATT nations then engaged in successive rounds of negotiations
to further reduce tariffs in order to facilitate international trade.93 The result of
these negotiations has been an outstanding success.94 Tariffs have been reduced
significantly from the pre-GATT era as a result of the promulgation of the
GATT and subsequent rounds of negotiations.95
Due to common political and economic interests, some nations have
sought to reduce tariffs even further than their GATT commitments.96 Some
nations, such as the U.S., wish to have free trade, that is, zero tariffs, on imports
from important allies in order to reward friendly nations and to deepen existing
political ties.97 The issue that arises with such free trade arrangements is the
limits imposed by Article I of the GATT98, the most-favored-nation (MFN)
principle, a bedrock and sacred pillar of international trade. Article I(1) of the
GATT reads in relevant part:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation . . . any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product . . . shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in . . . the
territories of all other contracting parties.99

The goal of the MFN principle is to ensure that members do not offer special
preferences to some countries while denying the same benefits to other WTO
members.100 In this sense, the MFN principle is really a principle of nonCHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 63–68. Overall, the WTO
dispute settlement system is viewed as a great success. See id. at 63.
93
94
95
96
97

98

See id. at 49–51, 180.
See id. at 180.
See id.
See id. at 51.
For example, under the North American Free Trade Agreement, the three member countries (the
U.S., Canada, and Mexico) have agreed to zero tariffs for virtually all goods traded among them. See
id. at 51, 56.
See GATT, supra note 87, at art. I.

99

The entire text of GATT Article I:1 reads:
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international
transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of
levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in
connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters
referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege
or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories
of all other contracting parties.
Id. at art. I:1.

100

See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 129.
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discrimination, as opposed to a principle of favoritism as the name might
suggest.101 A WTO member must extend equal treatment to all other WTO
members and cannot discriminate in favor of, or against, any other WTO
member.102 In the context of tariffs, the gist of the MFN principle is that any
GATT/WTO member that offers tariff preferences, including zero tariffs, to any
other GATT/WTO member must immediately and unconditionally offer the
same tariff preferences to every other WTO member.103 Under the MFN principle,
it becomes impossible to have a preferential trade agreement such as the TPP.
The whole point of the TPP is that TPP members receive preferential treatment
that is not available to non-TPP members. Under the MFN principle, such
preferential treatment is discriminatory and a violation; a nation that extends zero
tariffs to goods from another nation must immediately and unconditionally extend
zero tariffs to all other WTO members.104 How, then, is it possible to have
preferential trade agreements such as the TPP under the WTO?
The answer lies in GATT Article XXIV:
4. The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of
trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer
integration between the economies of the countries parties to such
agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a customs union or of a
free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent
territories . . . .
5. Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as
between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs
union or of a free-trade area . . .105

The key language of Article XXIV is the first sentence of Article XXIV(5):
“[T]he provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent . . . the formation of a customs
union or a free trade area.”106 This language has been read to create an exception
101

See id.

102

See id.
See id. at 130.

103
104
105
106

See id.
See GATT, supra note 87, at art. XXIV:4-5.
A free trade area, such as NAFTA, allows for the free movement of goods within the members of
the free trade area, but subject goods from non-members of the free trade area to the individual
tariffs of each of the members. In the case of NAFTA, goods from the U.S. travel to Mexico and
Canada duty free, but goods from a non-NAFTA member are subject to the individual tariff rates
of each NAFTA member. For instance, goods from China that enter Canada would be subject to
Canadian tariffs, that enter the U.S. would be subject to U.S. tariffs, that enter Mexico would be
subject to Mexican tariffs. These tariffs might vary from nation to nation so that the importer might
pay a higher tariff in the U.S. than an importer might pay in Mexico. Free trade areas thus encourage
forum shopping for the cheapest tariff rate among the members of the free trade area from which
the goods can then move around the free trade area duty free. This is why NAFTA has complex
rules of origin that are designed to eliminate this type of forum shopping. So under the NAFTA
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to the other provisions of the GATT, including the MFN principle in GATT
Article I. The result is that under a free trade agreement or a customs union, the
MFN principle does not apply because, if it did, it would prevent the formation
of a free trade area in contravention of the express language of GATT Article
XXIV:5. Under this interpretation, free trade areas such as the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and a customs union such as the E.U.—the two
most prominent free trade agreements and customs unions—are permitted to
exist as exceptions under GATT Article XXIV:5 to the MFN principle contained
in GATT Article I. The TPP is also permitted to provide favorable treatment in
all areas of trade, including goods, services, foreign investment, and technology
trade without extending the same benefits to all other members of the WTO, such
as China. Extending favorable treatment to TPP members while excluding
benefits to non-members of the TPP, such as China, is perfectly legal under the
GATT/WTO. Indeed, as noted earlier, the WTO encourages free trade
agreements.107 So regardless of any argument that China might make to the
contrary, the TPP is consistent with the WTO.

B. The Effect of Preferentia l Trade Agreements in Creating and
Diverting Trade
The effect of excluding China from the TPP is that China, unless it joins,
will be unable to enjoy the benefits the TPP provides to all of its twelve member
states. The short-term goal of the TPP is to reduce tariffs among its members
below their current GATT rates and, in the long term, to eliminate all tariffs in
order to have a true free trade area.108 As all TPP tariffs are reduced to below
current GATT rates, members of the TPP enjoy “WTO plus” treatment for their
goods because imports from TPP countries will enjoy better tariff treatment than
they would under the WTO.109 The economic effect of this preferential treatment
rules of origin if a good from China enters Mexico and then enters the U.S., the U.S. might treat
the good as originating from China and impose ordinary tariffs. A customs union, like the E.U.,
also has free movement of goods among all of its members (that is, duty free treatment) but imposes
a single external tariff on non-members of the E.U. Thus, it makes no difference whether goods
from China enter the E.U. through Italy, France, Germany, or Belgium; the goods are subject to
the same tariff, thus eliminating the incentive to forum shop. Of course, a single external tariff
requires greater economic integration than a free trade area. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 55–56.
107
108

109

See GATT, supra note 87, at art. XXIV:4.
TPP, art. 2.4 entitled “Elimination of Customs Duties” states in relevant part: “Unless otherwise
provided in this Agreement, each Part shall progressively eliminate its customs duties on originating
goods in accordance with its Schedule to Annex 2-D (Tariff Commitments).” TPP, supra note 1, at
art. 2.4(2).
All of the TPP members are also WTO members, which means that they currently maintain WTO
tariffs. The concept is to reduce the rates to zero under the TPP. Thus, TPP members receive
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is to increase trade and political cooperation among TPP member states.110 This
is apparent because imports that are subject to TPP tariffs are less expensive than
imports that are subject to WTO tariffs. The lower TPP tariffs on goods from
other TPP countries will be less expensive to the importer, which in turn will pass
on the savings to the consumer driving up demand for the imports. This will
result, in the long term, in an increase in trade among TPP members. This is how
PTAs result in increases in trade among their members. Similar arguments can be
made for other sectors, such as trade in services, investment, and technology.
Although each area differs in some ways from the trade in goods, the basic
concept of preferential treatment is the same—all areas of trade will increase
between TPP members.111
What might be less apparent is that preferential trade agreements also divert
trade (and perhaps political cooperation) from non-members.112 To take a
concrete example, suppose that after the TPP takes effect, an importer in the U.S.
has the choice between importing two substantially similar products either from
China, a non-member of the TPP, or from Vietnam, a TPP member. Assume for
the purposes of this hypothetical that the U.S. GATT rate for the product is five
percent for all imports (including imports from China) but that the TPP rate for
the same product from Vietnam is zero. If the products from China and Vietnam

110

“WTO plus” treatment.
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 52.

111

Various governmental and non-governmental sources indicate that the U.S. should see an increase
in all other areas of trade in addition to the trade in goods. For example, the United States Trade
Representative believes that the TPP will increase U.S. exports of services. Trans-Pacific Partnership:
Summary of U.S. Objectives, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., https://perma.cc/X6YC-CBQ7 (last
visited Oct. 25, 2016) The Trade Representative has stated:
Services industries account for four out of five U.S. jobs and also represent a
significant and growing share of jobs in other TPP countries. Securing
liberalized and fair access to foreign services markets will help U.S. service
suppliers, both small and large, seeking to do business in TPP markets, thereby,
supporting jobs at home.
Id. The USTR also believes that the TPP will boost U.S. exports of technology (that is, intellectual
property) intensive goods. Id. (“In TPP, we are working to advance strong, state-of-the-art, and
balanced rules that will protect and promote U.S. exports of IP-intensive products and services
throughout the Asia-Pacific region.”). Another institutional study indicates that the TPP will boost
outward U.S. technology transfer. See Nam D. Pham et al., NDP Analytics, The Economic Benefits of
Intellectual Property Rights in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 4 (2014). https://perma.cc/T422-8GSQ. Both
inward foreign investment from other countries and outward U.S. foreign direct investment in other
countries are expected to rise as a result of the TPP. Theodore H. Moran & Lindsay Oldenski, TPP
Will Promote Investment as Well as Trade, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Mar. 10, 2015, 11:15 AM),
https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/tpp-will-promote-investment-well-trade.
These benefits are reciprocal, that is, U.S. trading partners should be a similar increase in their
modes of trade in additional to the trade in goods.

112

See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 52.
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are similar in quality, a rational importer will choose to import the product from
Vietnam.
Under the hypothetical five percent GATT rate tariff, an imported product
from China with a price of $1 will cost the importer $1.05 with the tariff included
and the importer will then pass the cost onto the consumer in the form of a 5cent increase in price.113 This might seem to be a trivial difference, but it is not.
Suppose that the importer orders one million units of the product, which would
not be unusual for any number of items used regularly by consumers, such as
textiles (clothing). At this point, the GATT tariff on goods from China will cost
the importer an extra $50,000 dollars to import as opposed to the products
imported from Vietnam. In every highly competitive industry, even slight cost
differentials can be decisive. Continuing our hypothetical, assume that the retail
price of the product is $5; at this price point, the consumer will pay $5 for the
import from Vietnam but $5.25 for the same product from China. This cost
difference does not factor in the cost of a sales tax in some states that is usually
assessed as a percentage of the retail price of the goods, which will further increase
the price of the import from China. (Assuming a six percent retail tax, the import
from Vietnam will cost $5.30 whereas the import from China will cost $5.67.)
Assume further that the items are not sold individually but come in a convenient
package of ten at the retail level because few consumers are likely to purchase the
particular item one at a time. The consumer will pay $50 for a package of ten
products from Vietnam but $55.65 dollars for the same package from China
(including a six percent sales tax).
Over time, what will occur? As rational economic actors, importers and
consumers will prefer to buy the imports from Vietnam, and the imports from
China will go unsold. As a result, the importer will stop importing goods from
China and import them from Vietnam instead. If we generalize this example to
goods across many sectors, including high technology goods, the U.S. might be
able to source goods across many industries from TPP countries instead of from
China. Recall that Japan and Australia are also members of the TPP and other
countries, such as South Korea, have indicated that they wish to join. This could
give the U.S. many sources of goods comparable to Chinese goods in all areas,
including high technology areas (for example, auto parts) but at a lower price
because of the preferential tariff for TPP members. If China does not join the

113

The importer, usually a distributor, pays the increased tariff in order to clear the goods at customs
so that they will be allowed to enter the internal market. What prevents the importer from absorbing
the price increase and not passing on the price increase onto the consumer in the form of higher
retail prices? The answer is nothing. If the importer does not pass on the increased tariff to the
consumer, then the importer simply earns fewer profits. Most importers, however, wish to
maximize profits and so for this reason higher tariffs usually mean higher prices for consumers.
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TPP, China’s trade with the U.S. and other TPP members will be diverted to other
TPP countries and China could suffer a loss in trade opportunities.114

C. The Political Benefits of Diverting Trade from China
Diverting trade away from China serves important U.S. interests at the
present because of the heated political criticism and vehement populist anger over
the ever-mushrooming trade deficit with China, which reached a record $365.7
billion in 2015. 115 The breakdown of this figure indicates that in 2015, the U.S.
sold $116.2 billion in exported goods to China while purchasing $481.9 billion of
imports from China.116 To place the trade deficit with China in historical
perspective, in one year from 2014-2015, the U.S. trade deficit grew by almost $30
billion, a 6.6% increase.117 In 1985, the U.S. trade deficit with China was $6
million;118 the 2015 figure represents a growth of over 60,000 times in three
decades. The U.S. trade deficit with China is much larger (by $230 billion) than
the combined trade deficits of the next four largest U.S. trade deficits with a single
country: Germany ($74 billion), Japan ($68 billion), Mexico ($58 billion), and
Vietnam ($30 billion).119 The U.S. trade deficit with China is nearly five times that
of the U.S. trade deficit with Germany.
The negative consequences of the U.S. trade deficit with China can be
understood through reviewing some basic international economic principles.
When a nation experiences a trade deficit, it is buying more goods from its trading
partner than it is selling.120 In other words, a nation with a trade deficit is spending
more than it is earning from international trade.121 In the case of the U.S., it is
spending $365.7 billion more than it is earning from the trade with China, and
China is becoming wealthier by $365.7 billion per year in its trade with the U.S.,
with the gap widening with every year. The long-term consequences for a nation
with a continuing trade deficit are that unless other growth factors are present (for
114

115

116
117
118

From a macroeconomic perspective, the balance between trade increases and trade diversion due
to free trade areas is the most important question for the multilateral trading system. To the extent
that trade increases outweigh trade diversion, the entire multilateral trading system is better off even
if some countries lose trade opportunities. To the extent that losses from trade diversion outweigh
trade increases, the preferential trade agreement then becomes a net loss for the multilateral trading
system.
See Terence P. Jeffrey, $365,694,500,000: U.S. Merchandise Trade Deficit With China Hit Record in 2015,
CNS NEWS, (Feb. 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/2LDT-ADRY.
See id.
See id.
See id.

120

See id.
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 30.

121

See id.
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example, the sale of services, innovation in technology, the influx of capital
through investment from foreign countries) the nation’s economy begins to shrink
and may become mired in debt.122
On the other hand, the nation enjoying the trade surplus will become flush
with cash from revenues earned from trade, its economy will grow quickly and, in
the case of China, become a global trading power.123 China could use its earnings
to buy more goods from the U.S. and reciprocate in the trade in goods, but China
has chosen not to do so.124 In China’s case, China is “hoarding”125 by choosing to
save instead of spend its earnings.126 China saves its earnings by using those
earnings from selling goods to the U.S. to buy more and more of the U.S. economy
in the form of U.S. government securities, such as treasury bonds. 127 The debtor
nation is trapped in a never ending cycle of an escalating trade deficit and
increasing debt.128 This is true for the U.S. as China is lending money to the U.S.
by buying U.S. debt instruments (in other words, U.S. treasury bonds that pay
interest to China and must pay the principal by a specific due date unless they are
renewed).129 The extra cash that the U.S. has available by borrowing from China
means that the U.S. does not have to raise revenue through other more painful
means such as increasing taxes on consumers or cut spending on government
services.130 The money loaned from China results in more consumer disposable
income that is being used by U.S. consumers to buy more cheap goods from
China, leading to an increase in the trade deficit.131 The U.S. then needs to borrow
even more (that is, sells more treasury bonds to China) to maintain its increasing
levels of consumption and spending on government services. The U.S. seems
trapped in a cycle of a spiraling trade deficit and increasing debt with China gaining
more and more economic power over the U.S.132 One way to deal with this cycle,
that is, to reduce the trade deficit, is to buy fewer goods from China and to buy
the same goods from another source, such as other countries in the TPP. This will
allow the U.S. to reduce the trade deficit with China and still at the same time

122
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124
125
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127
128
129

See id.
See id.
See id. at 45.
This is a term used by critics of China. See id. at 46.
See id. at 45.
See id. at 45–46.
See id. at 47.
See id. at 46–48.
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See id. at 47.
See id.
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See id.
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maintain or increase its level of consumption in order to satisfy consumer demand
and avoid painful austerity measures.
A related hot-button issue that stems from the trade deficit in goods with
China is that some U.S. companies are moving their operations overseas. 133
Chinese goods are popular with U.S. consumers due to their quality and low
cost.134 Some U.S. companies are responding by moving their manufacturing
operations to China in order to take advantage of the low cost of labor and other
lower costs in manufacturing.135 These U.S. companies manufacture goods in
China and then export them to the U.S.136 However, the movement of
manufacturing operations from the U.S. to China means that jobs in the U.S. are
being lost and replaced by jobs created in China.137 This is what is commonly
referred to as “outsourcing,” a disliked and politically charged term that seems to
immediately incite boiling anger and resentment in many people in the United
States.138 These negative sentiments towards China are exacerbated by arguments
expressed by some politicians that the advantages enjoyed by China are not the
result of greater efficiencies but by cheating through currency manipulation and
low standards in labor, among other practices.139
The virtue of the TPP is that trade will be diverted from China to other TPP
countries, reducing the trade deficit with China and the outsourcing of jobs to
China that so enrages some U.S. politicians and workers. The TPP countries will
need to abide by the high standards set forth in the TPP so they cannot “cheat”
in their trade with the U.S. as China currently does, according to China’s critics.140
While the TPP could result in the diversion of trade from China to the U.S.,
the same holds true for all members of the TPP. The same arguments made earlier
in this section apply to other TPP countries as well. All TPP members, such as
Australia and Japan, now have an economic incentive in the form of lower tariffs
to buy goods from other TPP members instead of from China. Exclusion from
133

134

135

136
137
138

See Katherine Peralta, Outsourcing to China Cost 3.2 Million Jobs Since 2001, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, (Dec. 11, 2014), https://perma.cc/4BTD-KHL9.
See Mark Huffman, Why Cheap Chinese Products Are About to Get Cheaper, CONSUMER AFFAIRS (Aug.
11, 2015), https://perma.cc/K7W5-LDXE.
See Kimberly Amadeo, How Outsourcing Jobs Affects the U.S. Economy, THE BALANCE, (June 25, 2016),
https://perma.cc/W7UQ-9ZGH.
See id.
See HUFFMAN, supra note 134.
Michael Snyder, Why Are the American People Mad? Maybe It is Because Millions of Their Jobs Have Been
Lost to Outsourcing and They Aren’t Coming Back, END OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (July 29, 2010),
https://perma.cc/5YCL-2NHG.

139

See Daniel Mills, China Cheats While the U.S. Suffers, ECONOMY
https://perma.cc/2PEQ-AHPV.

140

See id.

Winter 2017

389

IN

CRISIS (May 25, 2014),

Chicago Journal of International Law

the TPP means losses of trade opportunities for China, not only with the U.S.,
but also with the entire membership of the TPP, which currently accounts for
forty percent of world trade.141 This creates a serious dilemma for China.

III. H OW J OINING THE TPP W ILL N EUTRA LIZE M AJOR T RADE
A DVANTAGES C HINA C URRENTLY E NJO YS
One alternative for China is to join the TPP and enjoy the advantages of
lower tariffs and increased trade with the members of the TPP. This might seem
to be an obvious step but here is where the U.S. strategy has created the other
prong in the dilemma for China. In order to join the TPP, China must agree to
the terms of the TPP, as well as any other terms that the U.S. Congress might
demand as a price of admission to the TPP. China would also have to undergo a
humiliating process of approval of its TPP entry by the U.S. Congress, which
might relish an opportunity to criticize and humiliate China.142 While it is unclear
what demands Congress might place on China, a reading of the TPP illustrates
how several key provisions are meant specifically to neutralize the advantages that
China currently enjoys outside of the TPP.143 Compliance with the terms of the
TPP and other demands by Congress is the price of admission for China to get
access to the preferential treatment reserved to TPP members.

A. Workers’ Rights Under the TPP
One of China’s major advantages in trade that the U.S. sought to neutralize
is China’s comparatively low cost of labor.144 The average cost of manual labor in
China is less than $1 per hour while the average cost in the U.S. is nearly $20 per
hour.145 China’s low labor costs lead directly to less expensive goods—a key appeal
to the U.S. consumer and also a key factor in the growing U.S. trade deficit with
China. Critics argue that China’s low labor costs are made possible by a disregard
141

See HOWARD, supra note 3.

142

See supra note 15.
There are a number of hot button issues on which Congress might seek concessions from China.
For example, Congress might demand that China show greater respect for intellectual property
rights by cracking down on trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy, a major source of
contention between the U.S. and China and that China put a stop to its currency manipulation that
increases the U.S. trade deficit. For a discussion of counterfeiting, see DANIEL C.K. CHOW &
THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND
MATERIALS 537–53 (3d ed. 2015). For a discussion of China’s currency manipulation, see Daniel
C.K. Chow, Can the United States Impose Trade Sanctions on China for Currency Manipulation?, 16 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript on file with the author).

143

144

See M. Dana Baldwin, Addressing the Challenge of China’s Labor Cost Advantages, CENTER
SIMPLIFIED STRATEGIC PLANNING, INC. (2016), https://perma.cc/K4M3-B5VK.

145

See id.
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for workers’ rights, subjecting workers to intolerable and dangerous working
conditions, long hours, and forms of coerced or forced labor.146
The following provisions of the TPP related to workers’ rights were likely
also drafted by the U.S. with China in mind as the main target.147 Article 19.3 of
the TPP provides:
1. Each Party shall adopt and maintain in its statues and regulations, and
practices thereunder the following rights as stated in the ILO [International
Labor Organization] Declaration: (a) freedom of association and the effective
recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (b) the elimination of all
forms of forced or compulsory labour; (c) the effective abolition of child
labour and . . . a prohibition on the worst forms of child labour; and (d) the
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.148

The reference to the standards of the International Labor Organization
(ILO), contained in TPP Article 19.3, can be best understood in the context of
the long debate about including labor rights in the WTO culminating in the
declaration issued by the first WTO Ministerial Conference held in Singapore in
December 1996.149 At the time, a debate raged in the WTO on whether to
introduce human rights in the GATT and WTO.150 Although many attempts were
made, none succeeded, due to the controversial nature of the subject of human
rights.151 The Singapore Ministerial Declaration ended the controversy once and
for all by declaring that the ILO is the competent body to deal with labor
standards.152 The result of this decision is that workers’ rights are outside the
purview of the WTO and within the jurisdiction of the ILO.153
The most important consequence of the Singapore Declaration with relation
to workers’ rights is that the breach of workers’ rights cannot be used to justify a
trade restriction under the WTO.154 Rather, the complaining nation must assert its
claims within the ILO.155 However, the ILO is a toothless organization with no
146

147

148
149
150
151
152

See David Barboza, In Chinese Factories, Lost Fingers and Low Pay, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/05/business/worldbusiness/05sweatshop.html.
See Kelsey, supra note 17 (noting that every major proposal in the TPP is targeted at China). The
U.S. considers labor rights and trade to be an important trade issue as evidence by the inclusion of
provisions connecting labor and trade in every recent U.S. free trade agreement. See infra Section
IV.
TPP, supra note 1, at art. 19.3(1).
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 20, at 369.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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See id.
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real enforcement power.156 Limiting recourse to the ILO means that breaches of
workers’ rights in international trade are effectively unenforceable and will go
unpunished. The significance of incorporating the ILO’s basic principles within
the TPP is that the ILO principles become TPP legal obligations that are now
subject to the TPP’s dispute settlement system. This means that a TPP member
may be authorized to impose trade sanctions on another TPP member for breach
of workers’ rights, now giving teeth to the ILO’s principles.157 The TPP brings the
ILO’s principles within an international legal regime with effective enforcement
powers.
The TPP also adds two other significant provisions regarding workers’
rights. Article 19.3(2) states: “[e]ach Party shall adopt and maintain statutes and
regulations, and practices thereunder, governing acceptable conditions of work
with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and
health.”158 Article 19.5(1) states: “No Party shall fail to effectively enforce its
labour laws through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction in a
manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties after the date of entry
into force of this Agreement.”159 The major significance of these two provisions
is that they bring domestic labor laws and regulations within the purview of the
TPP and its enforcement mechanism. Like many countries, China has effective
labor laws on its books,160 but, according to critics, China fails to enforce these
laws in practice.161 Currently, the failure to enforce labor laws within China is
subject to recourse within the ILO, an illusory remedy, or within China’s own
domestic legal system. Within China’s domestic legal system, the complaining
party lacks any recourse if China’s own internal domestic systems fail to enforce
its labor laws, a common problem due to a number of systemic weaknesses. 162
Under the TPP, however, the failure of a TPP country to enforce its own labor
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laws now becomes a violation of the TPP and subject to the TPP’s dispute
settlement mechanism.
The consequence of the TPP’s labor provisions is that once China joins the
TPP, China will no longer be able to maintain factories that are dangerous and
unsanitary.163 Chinese factories can no longer require workers to toil through
onerous and unreasonable hours, or subject persons to forms of labor that could
be deemed to be coercive.164 If China does not abide by the TPP standards, the
U.S. can challenge China through the TPP dispute settlement system, with trade
sanctions as a possible option. Currently, the U.S. and U.S.-based multinational
corporations (MNCs) lack the ability to challenge China’s workers’ rights record
in any forum other than the ILO or China’s own legal system, a mechanism that
is not viewed as independent or impartial.165
From a competitive standpoint, meeting the TPP’s high labor standards
should result in an increase in labor costs and a corresponding increase in the price
of imports from China. The labor provisions of the TPP were designed by the
U.S. to neutralize one of China’s major advantages in trade—highly skilled and
conscientious but inexpensive manual labor created by substandard working
conditions.

B. Environmental Obligations U nder the TPP
The TPP incorporates a number of environmental provisions that are not
available under the WTO. In the WTO, environmental concerns are linked to
trade but only in an indirect and peripheral way by decisions of the WTO
Appellate Body, which functions as a high court of international trade. 166 By
contrast, the TPP explicitly ties environmental concerns to the trade in goods (as
well as in the other channels of trade) in the text of the TPP agreement itself.
The extensive environmental obligations under the TPP are the subject of
Article 20, with no parallel in the texts of the WTO. Most salient to the main
themes of this work is Article 20.5, Protection of the Ozone Layer, which
provides:
1. The Parties recognise that emissions of certain substances can significantly
deplete and otherwise modify the ozone layer in a manner that is likely to
result in adverse effects on human health and the environment. Accordingly,

163
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each Party shall take measures to control the production and consumption
of, and trade in, such substances.167

This TPP provision was likely drafted by the U.S. with the specific purpose
of reining in China. Why? China is the leading producer of greenhouse gases that
directly damage the atmosphere’s ozone layer.168 In other words, China poses the
world’s single greatest threat to the destruction of the ozone layer, and the key
objective of TPP Article 20.5 is the protection of the ozone layer. Ozone depletion
leads to global warming that could cause permanent and serious damage to the
environment.169 China continues to use a glut of coal-fired power plants—a source
of greenhouse gases—as part of its plan of national development.170 Not only does
China’s use of so-called “dirty fuel” harm the environment, but these fuel sources
create a competitive advantage. China uses coal-fired power plants because these
plants are a cheaper source of energy than other forms that are environmentally
sustainable. In the U.S., the use of coal-fired power plants has been replaced in
part by different alternatives such as gas, solar, and wind power, but these
technologies are generally much more expensive than coal.171 Using cheap sources
of energy, such as coal-fired power plants, leads to lower prices for goods
produced in such plants and gives China an advantage in its exports. TPP Article
20.5 imposes a mandatory duty to protect the ozone layer through controlling the
production of greenhouse gases (parties “shall take measures” to control ozone
depleting substances).
Article 20.5 is only one example of many provisions in Chapter 20 that create
greater obligations concerning environmental obligations. Other TPP provisions
require protection of the marine environment from ship pollution,172 the adoption
of corporate social responsibility policies by companies operating domestically
with respect to the environment,173 the management of fisheries such that fishing
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does not lead to overconsumption of fish species,174 and the control of the illegal
trade in certain endangered fauna and flora.175 All of these provisions will involve
additional environmental responsibilities (and costs) for China at the international
level, but this discussion has focused on Article 20.5 because it is intended to have
the most immediate and serious impact on China in the area of environmental
sustainability if China chooses to join the TPP.
Aside from the environmental benefits created by the TPP, and more
germane to the thesis in this Article,176 joining the TPP would also dull China’s
competitive advantages in manufacturing of inexpensive goods. To be consistent
with the TPP, China might have to abandon or limit the use of coal-fired power
plants and use alternative and more expensive, but environmentally friendly,
sources of power instead. Use of these more expensive alternative technologies
will increase the cost of producing goods in Chinese factories and neutralize a
major advantage that China currently enjoys in trade—cheap goods due to
production methods using outdated and highly polluting technologies.

C. Restrictions on China’s Support of State -Owned Enterprises
A third set of provisions in the TPP takes direct aim at China’s SOEs that
receive many forms of financial and non-financial assistance from the State. In its
2015 annual report to Congress, the U.S. Trade Representative stated:
Many of the problems that arise in the U.S.-China trade and investment
relationship can be traced to . . . the large role of state-owned enterprises and
other national champions in China’s economy, which continue to generate
significant trade distortions that inevitably give rise to trade frictions.177

An SOE is a business enterprise that is an administrative unit of the State.178
The State owns the SOE as opposed to ownership by a private person or group
of persons.179 China has a web of national policies to “incessantly strengthen” the
“vitality”180 of SOEs, considering them to be ingrained in the “lifeline of the
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economy.”181 China’s plan is to create SOEs that are “national champions” that
can dominate international trade.182 Reflecting the importance of SOEs in China,
all of the vital sectors of China’s economy are controlled by SOEs that have
monopolies in energy, transportation (including air and rail transport), banking,
electricity, water supply, and telecommunications.183 Recently, China reported the
existence of 144,700 SOEs, excluding banks, with total assets worth $13.6
trillion.184 The world’s largest company by capitalization is Petro-China,185 an SOE
that ranks ahead of Exxon-Mobil on the 2015 Fortune 500 list.186 China has three
SOEs among the top ten largest companies in the world.187 While other TPP
countries also have SOEs, China’s SOEs are unique in the role they play in China’s
economy, their size and financial strength, and the power they wield in China’s
economy. The importance of SOEs to China’s national interests means that the
State provides support to SOEs in myriad forms. This state assistance to SOEs
comes at the expense of MNCs with operations in China.188
MNCs doing business in China often claim that the Chinese government
discriminates against them in favor of SOEs through three common practices.
First, SOEs often prefer purchasing goods and service from other SOEs rather
than MNCs.189 Purchasing agents might prefer to purchase goods from sources
they have dealt with in the past or from sales agents in other SOEs with which
they have personal or professional relationships.190 A more nefarious possibility is
that purchasing agents working in SOEs may receive a kickback (as in, a bribe)
from the sales agent of SOE that sells the product.191
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Second, MNCs claim that the Chinese government discriminates against
MNCs under important regulatory regimes, such as the Anti-Monopoly Law
(AML) and under various anti-bribery laws.192 For example, MNCs argue that
Chinese authorities apply the AML to benefit SOEs by blocking acquisitions of
Chinese companies by MNCs or by imposing onerous conditions on MNCs such
as requiring the sale of assets to SOEs in order to approve a merger or acquisition
by an MNC of a Chinese company.193 Chinese authorities use the AML to impose
or threaten to impose heavy fines in order to force MNCs to reduce prices on
their products while not subjecting SOEs to these pressures.194 MNCs also argue
that Chinese authorities are cracking down on MNCs under anti-bribery laws
while ignoring similar conduct by SOEs.195 Recently, Chinese authorities imposed
a record $500 million fine on GlaxoSmithKline for bribing Chinese doctors and
hospitals to prescribe its medications.196 MNCs note that this record fine was
imposed on an MNC while SOEs that engage in far more egregious conduct go
unpunished.197
A third common complaint is that China provides subsidies (financial
contributions) to SOEs, a form of financial assistance.198 The effect of a subsidy
is that it lowers the operating costs of SOEs, providing a competitive advantage
over MNCs in China. Subsidies to SOEs also provide a competitive price
advantage by lowering the cost of the products when they are exported into the
U.S. The lower price of Chinese goods provides them a competitive advantage
over competing U.S. products.
The WTO has provisions that prohibit discrimination in the purchase of
goods,199 discrimination in the application of internal regulations,200 and the
provision of subsidies.201 The WTO provisions, however, are general in nature
applying to all forms of discrimination and subsidies, whereas the TPP provisions
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were drafted specifically with SOEs in mind and directly target illegal conduct by
SOEs. The TPP provisions are designed to facilitate enforcement of specific
obligations against SOEs.
The TPP addresses all three of these concerns raised by U.S.-based MNCs.
Article 17.4 of the TPP requires SOEs to avoid discrimination in the purchase of
goods and services by giving treatment to goods and services from other TPP
parties treatment no less favorable than that accorded to SOEs.202 Article 17.5 of
the TPP prohibits discrimination in favor of SOEs in the exercise of regulatory
authority.203 Article 17.6 prohibits the use of “non-commercial assistance” to any
SOEs related to the production of goods or the supply of services. As the context
of Article 17.6 set forth below indicates, non-commercial assistance refers to
assistance that is not available in the marketplace but is provided only by a
government. In this context, assistance refers to:
i. direct transfers of funds or potential direct transfer of funds or liabilities,
such as: A. grants or debt forgiveness; B. loans, loan guarantees or other types
of financing on terms more favourable than commercially available to that
enterprise; or C. equity capital inconsistent with the usual investment practice,
including for the provision of risk capital, of private investors[ ] (ii) goods or
services other than general infrastructure on terms more favourable than
those commercially available to that enterprise.204

A comparison of this provision with the provisions in the WTO Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) indicates that the quoted text
of the TPP set forth above closely tracks SCM Article 1, which defines a “subsidy”
for the purpose of imposing a countervailing duty as an extra tariff imposed by
the importing country on a subsidized import to offset the effect of the subsidy.205
TPP Article 17.6 is specifically aimed at subsidies provided by China to SOEs
whereas the SCM deals with government subsidies provided to all types of private
businesses. The TPP is aimed directly at the type of subsidies that China is
202
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frequently accused of providing to its SOEs.206 The direct consequence of Article
17.6 is that it provides the U.S. with clear authority to impose countervailing duties
on subsidized imports from SOEs, neutralizing a major advantage that SOEs have
in international trade. The imposition of the countervailing duty will reduce the
demand for the imports by increasing their prices (as the importer passes on the
increase to the consumer) and will make U.S. products more competitive relative
to the now more expensive import. China will then be forced to either accept a
reduced demand that leads to fewer imports or remove the subsidy.
Due to the outsized role that SOEs enjoy in China and in global trade, these
provisions of the TPP were also likely drafted with China as the target. No other
current TPP country has SOEs that approach the size and power of China’s SOEs
or their dominance in international trade. Joining the TPP will make China’s most
frequently complained of practices that benefit SOEs illegal and will allow the U.S.
to directly challenge these practices in the TPP dispute settlement system.

IV. T HE U.S’ S G OAL TO BE THE F INAL A RBITER OF THE
R ULES OF I NTERNATIONAL T RADE
The negotiation process for the TPP, which proceeded without input from
China, may become a model for how the U.S. negotiates multilateral treaties in
the future. If this appears to be an aggressive tactic by the U.S. to control a rival,
this is exactly the intent. Discussing the TPP on May 2, 2016, President Obama
stated:
[The TPP] would give us a leg up on our economic competitors, including . . .
China. Of course, China’s greatest economic opportunities also lie in its own
neighborhood, which is why China is not wasting any time. As we speak,
China is negotiating a trade deal that would carve up some of the fastestgrowing markets in the world at our expense, putting American jobs, business
and goods at risk. . . . America should write the rules. America should call the
shots. Other countries should play by the rules that America and our partners
set, not the other way around. . . . The United States, not . . . China, should
write them.”207

Attempts by the U.S. to control China have not, of course, escaped China’s
notice, and they underscore how the relationship between the two countries has
increasingly become a fierce rivalry. The U.S. and China take starkly different
approaches to international trade treaties, which benefit the interests of each
country.
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The recent approach of the U.S. in all of its international trade treaties is to
link social issues such as workers’ rights and the environment to trade. This
practice began with the North American Free Trade Agreement, which came into
effect in 1994.208 As part of NAFTA, the parties also entered into two side
agreements: the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, which
includes provisions linking trade to workers’ rights,209 and the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, which includes obligations linking
trade to the environment.210 In 2011, the U.S. ratified the U.S. Korea Free Trade
Agreement (KORUS).211 KORUS includes a reciprocal obligation to adopt the
four basic principles of the ILO similar to the obligation created by TPP Article
19.3.212 The State Department’s Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, which serves
as a template for all future U.S. investment treaties, also contains provisions
related to workers’ rights and the environment as well as provisions on
transparency in government.213 These developments indicate that the U.S. will link
workers’ rights and environmental issues to trade in all future trade agreements.
None of these U.S. agreements contain any special provisions relating to SOEs,
another indication that the SOE chapter in the TPP was aimed directly at China.
By contrast, China’s trade agreements reveal a different approach. China has
entered into recent bilateral free trade agreements with its partners, including
Costa Rica (2011), Pakistan (2009), Peru (2009), Singapore (2009), New Zealand
(2008), and Chile (2006).214 On November 22, 2015, China signed a Protocol to
enhance the China Free Trade Agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (consisting of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam (collectively ASEAN)).215 China is
also negotiating the One Belt One Road agreements (so named after the historic
Silk Road used in ancient times to trade with Europe) that will create unblocked
208
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road and rail access from China to sixty European countries.216 China has many
more free trade agreements that are being negotiated. The hallmark of all of these
agreements is that they contain no provisions linking trade to workers’ rights and
the environment. China’s agreements also contain no provisions that limit the
trading rights of SOEs.
These two contrasting approaches concerning the linkage of social issues to
trade reflect a fundamental difference in philosophy in the use of trade to create
sticks and carrots on social issues and is a topic that is beyond the scope of this
Article.217 This Article has focused on the trade and economic effects of such
provisions. From this perspective, linking trade to workers’ rights and the
environment increases the costs of trade and is intended to neutralize the
competitive advantages (that is, lower prices) that China now currently enjoys in
international trade. According to the U.S. government, the TPP “level[s] the
playing field for American workers and American businesses . . . [and] will help
increase Made-in-America exports, grow the American economy, [and] support
well-paying American jobs.”218

V. C ONCLUSION
The U.S.’s attempt to contain China in international trade through the TPP
has left China with a dilemma: it can ignore the TPP and risk losses in trade
opportunities, or submit to the TPP and the humiliating process of applying to
the U.S. Congress to join the TPP. 219 In the author’s view, China is not likely to
join the TPP, to surrender itself to a humiliating defeat in international trade, and
to acknowledge that China has been outsmarted by the U.S. The other alternative,
losing international trade opportunities with nations that account for forty percent
of global trade,220 also does not seem acceptable. What will China do?
China may choose a third alternative—negotiate its own multilateral
preferential trade agreements on its own terms with its trading partners in Asia
and outside of Asia that will exclude the U.S. Indeed, China is now negotiating a
rival preferential trade agreement in Asia called the Regional Comprehensive
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Economic Partnership (Regional Partnership).221 By some measures, the Regional
Partnership is more impressive than the TPP because the Regional Partnership
covers nearly half the world’s population and four times the number of workers
and consumers covered by the TPP.222 A major difference between the two is that
the Regional Partnership includes China—the world’s most populous nation—
and India—the world’s second most populous nation and a growing economic
power in its own right—while the TPP does not.223 Countries that wish to preserve
a good relationship with both the U.S. and China have joined both the TPP and
the Regional Partnership with seven countries overlapping between the two
agreements.224 This overlapping membership will reduce the diversionary trade
effect of the TPP if China chooses not to join, because these countries will still
purchase Chinese goods, as these goods will still receive “WTO plus” treatment
under the Regional Partnership, not the TPP. Just as China was excluded from the
TPP negotiations, the U.S. was not invited to the negotiations for the Regional
Partnership.225 In addition to the Regional Partnership, China will undoubtedly
continue to negotiate individual free trade agreements with countries that will not
contain any of the provisions concerning workers’ rights, the environment, and
SOEs used by the U.S. to contain China.
These recent developments in the negotiation of trade agreements
underscore more clearly than ever that the U.S. and China see themselves as rivals,
not allies, in world trade. Given their contrasting approaches to international
trade, who writes the rules of international trade becomes paramount in the
rivalry. The U.S. will seek to neutralize China’s cost advantages in international
trade in all of its trade treaties and China will seek to preserve them in its trade
treaties. No one should be surprised at this result. It is a political reality that
nations enter into trade agreements that are in their best interests at the expense
of rivals. The U.S. has entered into trade agreements that promote its best interests
at the expense of China, and China has done the same at the expense of the U.S.
This Article is a study of how the TPP promotes U.S. interests at the expense of
China.
At this moment in history, whether the U.S. or China will write the rules of
international trade is an open question. What is not open to question is that the
stakes are high: the nation that writes the rules will likely gain supremacy in
international trade and will become the leading power in global trade in the
twenty-first century.
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